Georgia: another Sarajevo moment avoided

The great powers learnt in 1914 that small conflicts can easily and quite accidentally trigger world wars

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Who has heard of Freiherr von Musulin, apart from a few historians of Austria-Hungary and students of the diplomatic causes of the First World War? In 1925, he published his memoirs, which were reviewed in The Times Literary Supplement by the eminent historian, Lewis Namier. Musulin called his memoirs Das Haus am Ballplatz, which was the name of the Austrian Foreign Office.

Baron Musulin is not an outstanding figure in the history of European diplomacy; he was infinitely far from being a Metternich or a Talleyrand, yet perhaps he reshaped European history to a greater degree than either of them. From 1910 to 1916 he held the comparatively unimportant post of Chief of the Department for Church Affairs. In the summer of 1913, he took his holiday in Croatia, the country of his birth; on his return to Vienna he wrote a report on the Serbian problem, a subject on which he had not previously been regarded as an expert.

At some time in July 1914 he was asked to draft a diplomatic ultimatum to Serbia: “Wherein, on the basis of Serbia's moral responsibility for the events of June 28 [the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand] certain demands would be addressed to her for the suppression in future of Great-Serb propaganda.” He believed himself to have a reputation for “abilities for office work and stylistic skill”. He drafted the note on the assumption that the Serbians would accept it.

He was surprised when the note was rejected. He comments that: “It is altogether difficult to foresee the effect which any one political action may produce abroad.” Considering that the effect of his miscalculation was the First World War, 20 million dead, and all that has followed, that seemed an understatement.

Since 1914, the major powers have been concerned to avoid another Sarajevo moment, in which the world tumbled into war by accident. However, the war was not altogether an accident or a miscalculation. The more significant memoirs of Field Marshal Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, a grander and more aggressive figure than von Musulin, provide his real reasons for wanting a war. “Two principles were in sharp conflict: the maintenance of Austria as a conglomerate of various nationalities and the rise of independent national states claiming their ethnic territories from Austria-Hungary... For this reason, and not with a view to expiating the murder [of Franz Ferdinand], Austria-Hungary had to go to war against Serbia.”

No two historic events are identical, but there are disquieting resemblances between the Serbian crisis as it stood in July 1914 and the Georgian crisis as it stands in August 2008. There is the Russian factor that is central to both crises; there are conflicting nationalisms; there is the widespread feeling of anxiety. In 1914, Austria-Hungary was afraid of being let down by Germany, Germany was afraid of the growing strength of Russia, Russia was afraid of being let down by France, France was afraid of being let down by Britain, and Britain was alarmed by the growth of the German Navy. Every major power felt threatened. In the event, Serbia's rejection of the Austrian note pulled all of them into a war that few had wanted. The weakest power took the biggest decision.

The situation now is similar in many respects, but not in all. The big difference is that the Russian Federation is nearly 20 years beyond the time of Soivet Union's collapse. The Warsaw Pact had long since broken up, and most of the Warsaw Pact countries have joined the EU and Nato, without Russia being in a position to object. However, there are a number of newly independent countries, including Georgia, which were not members of the Warsaw Pact but part of the 19th and 20th- century Russian empire. This “near abroad” is seen by Russia as being inside Russia's natural sphere of influence.

The new Russia of Vladimir Putin is nationalist in the old tsarist fashion, and is determined to protect Russian interests. In the 1990s, the Yeltsin years, Russia could not assert these traditional Russian positions, because it was too weak. They are being reasserted now, and this reassertion is backed by Russia's growing importance as a provider of oil and gas.

In 1914 Europe had six major powers, Germany, France, Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia, all of which had imperial possessions. Most of these countries were coalitions of different nations, with domestic problems of nationalism. Britain, for instance, had the Irish problem.

In 2008, there are six major groupings in the world, the US, China, the EU, India, Russia and Japan. Islam is another matter. These groupings are all, to some degree, concerned about economic or political weaknesses in their own positions.

Some of these groups are rising powers, but others are in relative decline. Russia probably lacks the economic or population base to maintain Putinism in world competition. The US may well have another generation as the leading world power, but its lead is narrowing. Europe has not resolved the cultural differences of its membership. China and India are emerging superpowers. But these groupings are almost as uncertain as the European powers were in 1914, and the scarcity of future energy supplies makes them feel insecure.

In these circumstances, it was rash of the Government of Georgia to try to regain control of South Ossetia by force. How did it imagine that Russia would respond? Georgia is a candidate to join Nato, but the European members of Nato, particularly Germany, may feel that Georgia's Government is too impetuous to be given the Nato guarantee. In a world of uncertainty, the major powers cannot risk minor wars in case they become big ones.

William Rees-Mogg

www.timesonline.co.uk