Gloom and doom

How many missiles will be fired from Iran, Syria and Lebanon against Israel in the next war? This question, as well as the various future war scenarios, was the subject of an enlightening lecture early in the week by the commander of the Israel Air Force from 1996 to 2000, Major General (res.) Eitan Ben Eliahu.

His lecture surveyed the changes in Israel's national security doctrine amid the changing nature of wars, technology and the threats posed by the country's enemies. The lecture was initiated by an organization established after the Second Lebanon War, when the Israeli home front was hit by thousands of Hezbollah rockets. The Israel Missile Defense Association (www.imda.org.il) was founded by Avi Schnurr, a senior engineer who worked for many years in the United States military industries, immigrated to Israel and served as "the voice of missile defense in Israel."

A number of senior former defense officials - experts on missiles and advanced weapons systems - are active in the association, such as Uzi Eilam, the former director general of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission; David Ivry, the former commander of the Israel Air Force and a former director general of the Defense Ministry; and Uzi Rubin, who was involved in the development of the Arrow missile.

Their presence gives the association prestige and credibility, but because its members are linked to the defense establishment and some are even dependent on it financially, their freedom to express their views is limited, as is their willingness to criticize the system.

Eitan Ben Eliahu began his speech by defining the national security doctrine and the changes it has undergone. Since it was formulated in the early 1950s, the concept on exercising military force has advocated the following:

* An initiated war (a preventive strike). But if that is impossible then at least:

* A preemptive strike to disrupt the enemy's war preparations. But if war does break out, the Israel Defense Forces must conduct: b A holding operation after which it will go over to: Aerial superiority.

* A breakthrough in order to achieve:

* Final lines and a defeat of the enemy.

This doctrine outlined a scenario in which Israel would find itself at war on two or three familiar fronts (Egypt, Syria and Jordan). For that purpose, up until the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the military force was built up with a budget of $30 billion to $35 billion for buying planes, armored vehicles and a few ships, emphasizing that these weapons systems would be varied and allow for flexibility.

Two major lessons

According to the security doctrine, the process of defeating the enemy was based on weapons systems that would enable surprise, movement and initiative on the ground. In the air it was based on weapons that would make it possible to attack and destroy airfields and win aerial battles, and on the development of precise weaponry that would destroy ground-to-air missiles.

The War of Attrition (1968-1970) and the Yom Kippur War disrupted these basic assumptions. The Arabs drew two major lessons from their failure in the Six-Day War. They concealed their planes in underground hangars and purchased anti-aircraft missiles. As a result, the IAF suffered a severe blow (about 100 of its planes were downed or damaged - nearly 1.5 percent of its overall sorties), and at the time there was talk of "the missile that bends the wing of the plane." The IAF thus decided to operate against batteries of ground-to-air missiles and to induce enemy planes to leave their hiding places and take off, and then to bring them down.

According to the data presented by Ben Eliahu, during the War of Attrition, 104 enemy planes were downed. In the Yom Kippur War, 277 were downed, and in the first Lebanon war the IAF brought down 99 (Syrian) planes and hit 17 Syrian missile batteries, using electro-optical air-to-ground missiles.

The new needs have led to a 15 to 20 percent increase in the defense budget to between $35 billion and $40 billion.

But from the end of the 1980s, and particularly after the 1991 Gulf War, during which Iraq launched 40 Scud missiles, Israel found itself facing new and additional threats:

* strikes against the home front

* a short warning time (for beginning a war and adding a front)

* a prolonging- of the fighting

* non-conventional weapons (chemical and nuclear)

Some of these threats became even more acute during the Second Lebanon War and in the Gaza Strip.

As a result, Israel was forced to increase the security budget sharply, to $50 billion, and to update its national defense doctrine to prepare for scenarios of wars against Iran, Syria, Lebanon (and additional countries?) and terror with a strategic dimension.

To assess the intensity of these scenarios, Ben Eliahu presented figures from the Second Lebanon War. Hezbollah's missile inventory included about 14,000 missiles. About 4,200 missiles were launched, including about 200 medium-range missiles. The IAF carried out 11,870 sorties during the war's 34 days (an average of 340 sorties a day).

During these sorties the IAF destroyed 93 missile launchers - 50 of them in sorties based on precise intelligence on the first day of the war. The IAF also destroyed 33 "pipes" (simple launchers) using the "hunting method" (planes remained in the air to search for and find the launchers).

In his estimation, Israel must prepare for the next war according to the following script:

* One to three fronts

* Crush the enemy on one front

* Containing the Palestinian front

* Long-range punishment or response (Iran)

What should Israel's aim be in the next war?

On the basis of the precedent of the Gulf War, Ben Eliahu estimates that in the next war, Syria and Iran might launch between 250 and 300 long-range missiles at Israel (Shihab and Scud missiles) and another 5,000 short-range missiles (mainly from Lebanon).

To intercept a single long-range missile, one needs an average of two intercepting missiles and between 500 and 700 missiles in all.

In addition, Israel must keep another 200 intercepting missiles in reserve. To destroy the short-range missiles, Israel will need mainly ground forces.

Israel must prepare for a war that will last up to 20 days. Vis-a-vis Syria it must attain aerial superiority and embark on a ground attack for a strategic purpose, attack the missile and launcher sites and attack strategic targets.

Zooming in on an aerial attack

Vis-a-vis Lebanon, Israel has aerial superiority and will therefore have to focus only on an aerial attack against medium-range missiles and carry out a ground attack against short-range missiles.

On the Gaza front, the threat of Qassam rockets and mortar shells is, according to this analysis, "limited, exhausting and indirect," and the response must consist mainly of providing shelters for the civilians, developing more efficient warning and alarm systems - which will be able to identify launched missiles - and launching a ground offensive against the Palestinian guerrillas.

And above all Israel must grant high priority to development methods for confronting the chemical and nuclear threat.


By Yossi Melman
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/998447.html